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The	dismantling	of	the	State	since	the	1980s:	Brexit	is
the	wrong	diagnosis	of	a	real	crisis
Abby	Innes	writes	that	the	vote	to	leave	the	EU	and	the	administrative	chaos	around	it	pull	into
focus	the	crisis	we	should	have	been	talking	about	before:	the	failures	of	homegrown	neoliberal
policies	and	their	dire	implications.	She	argues	that	while	Brexit	has	been	heralded	by	supporters
as	a	solution	to	a	number	of	problems,	what	it	will	actually	do	is	to	accelerate	to	the	point	of
‘completion’	the	already	failed	experiments	to	reform	the	state.
The	Leave	campaign	in	2016	had	a	lot	in	common	with	the	1979	Conservative	election	manifesto.
Both	evoked	the	threat	of	a	bureaucratic	super-state	and	something	approaching	a	conspiracy	of
that	state	against	the	public.	Both	promised	to	rescue	a	Greater	Britain	from	the	conspiratorial
political	forces	that	were	holding	it	back.	Both	campaigns	were	a	misdiagnosis	of	the	real	crisis	at	hand.	This	time	we
face	a	crisis	of	ungovernability	potentially	far	more	severe	than	that	of	the	1970s;	but	its	roots	are	less	in	Europe	than
in	the	failures	of	the	homegrown	neoliberal	reforms	of	the	British	state.
The	‘supply-side	revolution’
The	last	three	decades	of	state	reform	in	Western	democracies	have	aggravated	rather	than	resolved	the	social
divisions	that	emerged	with	de-industrialisation.	Over	the	last	thirty	years,	liberal	market	economies	in	general	and
the	UK	in	particular	have	transformed	the	character	of	their	states	through	privatization	and	outsourcing,	through	the
development	of	quasi	markets	in	welfare,	and	the	rejection	of	industrial	policies.	At	the	same	time,	permissive	tax
and	regulatory	regimes	have	encouraged	large	corporations	to	opt	out	of	their	former	social	obligations	in	the	name
of	maximising	shareholder	value.
The	‘supply-side	revolution’	of	the	last	thirty	years	was	driven	by	the	dominant	New	Right	diagnosis	of	the	economic
crises	of	the	1970s	and	based	on	the	radical	public	choice	economics	aligned	with	the	Chicago	and	Virginia	schools.
According	to	this	diagnosis	it	was	the	state	that	was	primarily	responsible	for	the	end	of	the	post-war	‘golden	age	of
growth’	because	of	its	inhibition	of	the	market.	Thus,	according	to	the	New	Right	and	later	New	Labour	too,	it	wasn’t
technological	change,	or	de-industrialisation	in	the	face	of	emerging	markets,	it	wasn’t	the	Nixon	shock,	or	the	end	of
Bretton	Woods,	nor	rising	exchange	rate	instability,	it	wasn’t	stagflation	or	the	oil	crises	that	had	confronted	the
country	with	a	need	to	re-evaluate	its	production	regime.	It	was	the	state.	And	so	it	was	the	state,	above	all	else,	that
had	to	be	transformed.
The	first	problem	with	the	supply-side	logic:	the	state	as	a	firm
The	supply-side	critique	of	the	state	is	profoundly	flawed.	It	is	rooted	in	abstract	deductive	logic	derived	from	the	first-
principles	of	neoclassical	economics	uncalibrated	against	empirical	reality.	The	public	choice	school	based	its
understanding	of	politics	on	the	assumptions	of	neoclassical	economics	that	until	the	late	1950s	had	been	applied
only	to	decision-making	in	markets.	Carrying	over	this	methodology	drove	a	devastating	conclusion	that	is	actually
just	an	artefact	of	the	method	itself.	To	answer	their	questions	around	why	the	state	had	grown	in	the	post-war	era,
public	choice	theorists	simply	asserted	that	politicians,	bureaucrats	and	their	voters	are	self-interested	economic
actors	like	any	others	in	a	marketplace.
By	declaring	that	all	public	officials	should	be	understood	as	homo	economicus,	the	New	Right	could	reconceive	of
democratic	politics	as	a	process	in	which	politicians	are	effectively	entrepreneurs	who	compete	to	gain	control	over
the	resources	of	a	monopoly:	the	state.	To	increase	their	fiefdoms,	both	self-interested	politicians	and	bureaucrats
will	generate	policies	most	likely	to	appease	self-interested	voters	in	the	market	for	votes.	By	this	logic,	according	to
the	New	Right,	democracy	is	doomed	to	crowd	itself	out:	the	demand	for	state	privileges	by	individually	self-seeking
voters	will	never	be	satisfied	until	the	growth	of	the	state	has	reached	an	unstoppable	momentum	towards
totalitarianism.	Bureaucrats,	as	in	any	monopoly	firm,	will	tend	only	towards	exploitative	price-making	and	general
budgetary	greed.	A	responsible	politician	will	strip	the	state	of	its	powers	to	intervene	in	a	‘free’	market:	the	only
‘honest’	mechanism	in	a	rationally	selfish	world.
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The	micro-foundations	behind	this	thesis	make	it	philosophically	extreme.	They	assume	a	society	populated	by
individuals	who,	in	all	contexts,	deploy	a	clear	and	cold	calculation	of	the	costs	and	benefits	of	their	actions,	and	do
so	with	perfect	information	about	their	options.	The	supply-side	diagnosis	assumes	that	individuals	are	super-
humanly	rational	around	their	immediate	interests	but	completely	witless	about	social	or	constitutional	considerations
and	unmoved	by	ethics	as	distinct	from	material	gain:	implicitly,	theirs	is	a	voting	population	that	can’t	tell	the
difference	between	the	NHS	and	communism.	It	is	in	this	light	that	the	European	Union	is	viewed	as	no	more	and	no
better	than	a	cartel	of	self-seeking	monopoly	enterprises.	Clearly,	if	you	conceive	of	the	state	in	this	way	then	the
only	rational	solution	is	not	to	reform	it	but	to	break	it.
The	second	problem	with	the	supply-side	logic:	the	state	as	a	standard	economic	agent
But	what	if	this	metaphor	is	just	wrong?	What	if	it	was	always	a	normative	assertion	by	a	faction	of	academic
theoreticians	on	a	roll	rather	than	an	argument	based	on	the	historical	evolution	of	actual	states.	What	if	the	theory
was	an	irresistible	platform	for	large	corporations	who	preferred	to	return	to	the	good	old	days	of	laissez	faire	over	a
wise	or	sustainable	political	economic	strategy?	What	if	a	failed	firm	enforces	a	limited	reallocation	of	labour	and
capital,	and	a	failing	state	collapses	the	effective	mechanisms	for	democratic	representation,	the	stability	of
capitalism,	social	integration	and	public	order	as	such?
Not	only	does	the	supply-side	revolution	reintroduce	market	failures	where	they	had	always,	historically,	failed,	it
introduces	state	failures	where	they	hadn’t	previously	existed.
As	the	economic	theories	of	contract	and	property	rights	make	clear,	the	higher	the	complexity	of	a	good	or	product,
the	higher	the	risk	of	so-called	‘asymmetrical’	contracts	in	which	the	seller	has	more	information	than	the	buyer	and
hence	can	exploit	that	buyer.	This	is	a	fundamental	problem	when	the	state	becomes	that	customer	at	the	taxpayers’
expense.	Transaction	cost	theory	shows	that	trying	to	manage	such	asymmetrical	contracts	leads	to	massively
increased	costs.	And	these	costs	can	never	be	rendered	efficient	because	of	the	intrinsically	unbalanced	nature	of
the	original	contract,	because	of	the	complexity	of	the	good.	After	thirty	years	the	evidence	suggests	that	introducing
businesses	into	the	UK	state	and	competition	between	states	produces	the	worst	of	both	public	and	private	regimes.
In	the	case	of	welfare	reforms,	the	UK	norm	has	become	one	of	profit-seeking	firms	engaged	at	the	tax-payers
expense	but	in	thoroughly	non-competitive	conditions.	The	resulting	failure	to	produce	either	high	quality	services	or
lower	costs	has	forced	the	state	into	doomed	games	of	ever	more	Kafkaesque	remedial	action	because	of	its
continuing	statutory	responsibility	for	outcomes.	Thus,	in	the	name	of	this	continuing	supply-side	experiment	our
schools,	health	service,	prisons,	transport	services	and	social	care	institutions	have	become	text-book	case	studies
for	‘moral	hazard’,	in	which	private	providers	have	few	incentives	to	avoid	risky	or	perfunctory	behaviour	because	of
the	de	facto	insurance	of	continued	public	payment.
Private	provision	and	its	effect	on	government	accountability
And	this	is	before	you	consider	the	conflicts	of	interest	that	increasingly	run	through	UK	policymaking	structures	like
a	stick	of	rock.	A	relatively	hidden	dimension	of	today’s	crisis	of	state	failure	is	the	increasingly	pervasive	role	for
private	businesses	throughout	the	entire	state	administration.	After	a	sabbatical	in	the	Cabinet	Office	Matthew
Flinders	reported	that	UK	central	government	had	lost	the	capacity	to	operate	‘meta-governance’	over	state	authority.
That	was	in	2005.	Since	then	that	authority	has	increasingly	been	gifted	into	private	hands.	This	process	of	dis-
integrating	state	capacity	was	intensified	after	2010	under	the	renewed	supply-side	zeal	of	the	coalition	and
Conservative	governments.
In	2015	Ruth	Dixon	and	Christopher	Hood	found	that	reported	administration	costs	in	the	UK	had	risen	by	40%	in
constant	prices	over	the	previous	thirty	years,	despite	a	third	of	the	civil	service	being	cut	over	the	same	period,
whilst	total	public	spending	doubled.	Running	costs	were	driven	up	most	in	the	outsourced	areas.	Deep	failures	of
service,	complaints,	and	judicial	challenges	had	soared.	This	was	in	no	respect	the	‘better	government	for	less
money’	promised	by	governments	of	left	and	right.	These	reforms	have	also	undermined	the	accountability	of
government	because	the	more	the	state	has	become	structurally	dependent	on	private	provision	the	harder	it’s
become	to	reverse	even	openly	failing	policies:	the	state	capacity	that	used	to	be	there	has	frequently	been
destroyed.	The	administrative	chaos	around	Brexit	demonstrate	to	the	wider	public	the	dysfunction	that	those	who
depend	on	the	state	have	suffered	for	years.
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The	democratic	principle	of	fiscal	consent	is	that	people	are	willing	to	pay	their	taxes	because	the	liabilities	are	fair
and	the	revenues	never	confiscated.	But	that	principle	is	severely	stretched.	The	wealthiest	firms	have	escaped	their
side	of	the	fiscal	contract	through	an	international	race	to	the	bottom	on	tax	rates,	standards,	and	enforcement.	In	the
meantime	the	burden	of	continuing	taxation	has	been	pushed	onto	less	mobile	factors	such	as	labour,	consumption,
and	small	and	medium-sized	businesses.
And	all	of	this	might	have	been	worth	it	had	we	gained	the	promised	renaissance	of	investment,	innovation,	higher
quality	employment,	and	growth	that	was	supposed	to	occur	spontaneously	when	the	state	was	got	out	of	the	way.
But	what	we	have	seen	instead	is	the	transformation	of	post-war	democratic	capitalism	from	a	system	of	wealth-
creation	to	one	of	wealth	extraction.
A	process	of	financialisation	has	occurred	on	three	levels:	financial	markets	and	institutions	increasingly	displace
other	economic	sectors	as	the	source	of	profitable	activity.	Non-financial	corporations	are	becoming	financialized
through	a	regime	of	maximizing	shareholder	value,	wherein	profits	are	increasingly	extracted	for	higher	executive	pay
through	share	buy-backs	and	dispersed	through	higher	share	dividends	rather	than	reinvested.	Finally,	finance	has
penetrated	into	every	aspect	of	life	as	people	are	increasingly	incorporated	into	financial	activity,	and	to	a	degree	that
significantly	increases	the	systemic	risk	inherent	in	the	boom	and	bust	cycles	of	poorly	regulated	financial	markets.
The	existing	structural	divisions	and	the	EU	referendum
For	a	doctrine	to	require	a	super-human	rationality	to	function	as	promised	makes	it	totalitarian,	whether	that
rationality	is	social,	as	in	Marxism-Leninism,	or	utilitarian,	as	in	neoliberalism:	it	requires	a	perfect	consistency	of
human	character.	But	it’s	also	in	the	nature	of	such	ideologies	that	in	the	face	of	often	terrible	social	consequences
their	dogmatism	encourages	the	doubling	down	on	their	projects	in	the	belief	that	the	validity	of	the	programme	will
be	finally	proved	at	the	point	of	completion.	As	a	result,	the	energy	of	these	doctrines	only	becomes	fully	unspooled
once	the	disorder	that	they	create	has	spread	to	every	single	part	of	the	polity.	Hard	Brexit	is	an	invitation	from
supply-side	zealots	to	enter	the	full	disorder	of	a	‘liberated’	market.
The	Global	Financial	Crisis	was	also	used	as	a	pretext	by	George	Osborne	for	an	acceleration	of	the	supply-side
project	but	that	same	government	was	heedless	enough	of	the	social	consequences	to	offer	an	opportunity	for	a
public	judgement	on	the	current	direction	of	travel:	the	2016	Referendum.	The	findings	on	subjective	attitudes	are
telling.	Those	most	likely	to	vote	Leave	were:
Those	finding	it	difficult	to	manage	financially	(70%)	or	just	about	getting	by	(60%);
Those	who	believed	Britain	has	got	a	lot	worse	in	the	last	ten	years	(73%);
Those	who	think	things	have	got	worse	for	them	rather	than	other	people	(76%);
Those	who	perceive	themselves	as	working	class	(59%).	Those	who	see	themselves	as	English	rather	than
British	(74%)	or	more	English	than	British	(62%).
These	are	constituencies	built	by	the	supply-side	revolution.	They	were	unlikely	to	be	persuaded	by	a	Remain
campaign	that	spoke	only	of	the	economic	joys	of	the	status	quo.	The	voting	split	for	Remain	versus	Leave	is
between	the	centres	of	the	new	knowledge	economy	–	rooted	in	ICT	and	services	–	and	those	of	the	rural,	industrial
and	mid-range	technology	economies,	abandoned	by	a	state	no	longer	understood	by	government	as	the	historical
midwife	of	development.
These	trends	support	the	worrying	thesis	that	there	are	deepening	structural	divisions	in	advanced	capitalist
economies	between	those	higher	educated	voters	who	prefer	the	labour	market	dynamism	of	highly	liberalised
economies,	versus	those	with	little	hope	of	achieving	a	stake	in	any	such	system.[1]	The	rising	emphasis	on	English
national	identity	follows	as	a	reaction	to	the	unmanageable	pace	of	globalisation:	the	scale	of	displacement	of
manufacturing	activities	by	imports	into	a	region	drove	perceptions	around	the	risks	of	immigration	more	than	the
scale	of	immigration	as	such.	This	is	hardly	a	trajectory	compatible	with	democracy.
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It	was	under	these	conditions	that	the	referendum	was	heralded	by	Leave	as	the	solution	to	the	collective	pain	and
frustration	of	an	already	divided	society.	Under	the	UK’s	constant	leadership	the	EU	had	often	become	a	champion
of	neoliberal	policies.	More	often,	however,	it	had	acted	as	a	brake	on	the	more	extreme	preferences	of	UK	supply-
sider	governments.	It	was	the	Conservative,	Labour	and	Liberal	parties	in	government	that	made	of	the	British	state
both	an	inefficient	public	regime	and	an	increasingly	extractive	private	regime	dominated	by	large	corporations.	The
historical	irony	is	that	the	supply-side	revolution	has	effectively	built	the	state	that	haunted	the	fever	dreams	of	the
public	choice	theorists.
Brexit	as	the	last	chance	saloon
So	why	are	we	leaving	the	largest	trading	block	in	the	world	rather	than	having	an	empiricist	public	debate	about	the
systemic	crisis	of	the	domestic	political	economy?	One	reason	is	that	this	crisis	creates	no	neat	division	between
party	lines	as	it	did	in	1979:	no	party	but	the	Greens	gains	from	discussing	their	role	in	these	developments.	For
Labour	it	is	the	deepest	ideological	division	between	its	right	and	left.	The	expressive	function	of	parties	is	further
discouraged	when	the	most	powerful	actors	across	the	political	economy	are	likewise	implicated,	from	the	City	to	the
CBI.	Even	if	supply-side	reforms	hadn’t	built	so	powerful	a	large	business	constituency	for	their	extension,	it	would	be
awkward	for	mainstream	elites	to	call	for	the	renewal	of	central	and	local	state	capacity	after	so	many	years	of
insisting	its	relative	incompetence.
The	entire	history	of	empiricist	political	economy	tends	to	teach	us	that	both	states	and	markets	have	their	virtues
and	their	vices.	The	virtues	are	typically	interactive.	Cooperative	solutions	tend	to	be	more	efficient	than	markets	at
solving	problems	characterised	by	complexity	and	uncertainty:	Germany’s	stakeholder	production	regime	is
exceptionally	functional.	Given	the	urgency	of	climate	change	the	debate	we	ought	to	be	having	is	about	how	to
develop	a	political	economic	strategy	with	ecology	at	its	very	core.	Even	were	we	not	dangerously	behind	on	climate
mitigation	it	is	unclear	how	the	trend	towards	increasing	social	polarisation	driven	by	a	doctrinally	and	practically
corporate-captured	state	could	be	reversed	without	a	radical	shift	in	the	political	economic	paradigm.
But	in	the	face	of	these	realities	the	strategy	of	the	hard	Brexiteers	is	uniquely	unwise:	it	is	to	accelerate	to	the	point
of	‘completion’	the	already	failed	supply-side	experiments	of	the	last	thirty	years	and	to	deny	climate	change,	all	in
pursuit	of	arrangements	that	exist	nowhere	but	in	the	pages	of	the	economic	utopias	of	the	1960s.	Brexit	militants
have	offered	no	precise	strategy	for	free-market	greatness	because	it	exists	in	no	realisable	place:	the	days	of	the
British	Empire	are	mercifully	finished,	a	democratic	free	market	is	a	fantasy.	For	its	leadership,	Brexit	is	the	last
opportunity	to	radically	dismantle	the	state-as-economic-referee	as	the	window	on	the	popularity	of	neoliberalism
starts	to	close.	It	is	the	hard	right	equivalent	of	rallying	for	Soviet	Communism	in	1989.	As	Arthur	Koestler	wrote	of
his	former	ideological	zeal,	“Gradually	I	learned	to	distrust	my	mechanistic	preoccupation	with	facts	and	to	regard	the
world	around	me	in	the	light	of	dialectic	interpretation.	It	was	a	satisfactory	and	indeed	blissful	state.”	Koestler	was
talking	about	communism,	but	it	sounds	familiar	for	a	reason.
When	it	comes	to	history	repeating	itself,	it	is	both	tragic	and	farcical	that	it	is	the	most	militant	supply-siders	of	all
who	were	crowned	by	the	2016	Referendum.	It	is	this	faction	above	all	that	gets	the	diagnosis	of	our	current
condition	most	exactly	wrong.	It	is	their	idea	of	a	cure	that	would	be	most	lethal	to	the	British	body	politic.
_______
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